For much of the post-colonial period, South Asian politics was framed around nationalism, development, and the legacy of anti-imperial struggle. Religion was present, often powerfully so, but it was rarely admitted as the central organising principle of the state. That balance has shifted dramatically. Across South Asia today, religion has moved from the margins to the very core of political life, shaping elections, redefining national identity, and influencing domestic and foreign policy in ways that would have seemed unthinkable a few decades ago.
The roots of this transformation lie partly in the unfinished business of Partition. The division of British India in 1947 institutionalised religion as a political marker by creating Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims while India adopted a formally secular constitution. From the outset, however, religion remained embedded in political imagination. Secularism in India was less the absence of religion than an attempt to manage deep diversity. In Pakistan, debates over whether the country would be Islamic in spirit or structure persisted from its earliest years. These unresolved questions created fertile ground for religion to re-emerge as a decisive political force.
India offers the clearest example of religion’s ascent to political dominance. For decades, the Indian state projected itself as secular and pluralist, even while religious identities shaped voting behaviour and social life. This equilibrium began to erode with the rise of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, which argues that India is fundamentally a Hindu civilisation and should be governed accordingly. The electoral victories of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party marked a decisive turning point. Under their leadership, religion has become a defining language of power rather than a background cultural reference.
Hindutva politics reframed national belonging in explicitly religious terms. Muslims and Christians, despite being citizens, increasingly found themselves portrayed as outsiders or potential threats. Policies such as citizenship reforms, changes in Kashmir’s status, and the public celebration of religious symbols sent a clear message about whose identity lay at the heart of the nation. Equally important was what did not happen: repeated instances of hate speech and religious mobilisation were met with silence or tacit approval from the highest levels of authority. Religion thus became not only a belief system but a tool of political consolidation.
This shift was not confined to India alone. In Pakistan, religion has long played an explicit role in politics, but its function has evolved. Initially invoked to unify a diverse population, Islam gradually became a mechanism for legitimising military rule, suppressing dissent, and defining citizenship. Over time, Islamist parties, religious clerics, and militant groups gained influence disproportionate to their electoral strength. While Pakistan has oscillated between civilian and military governments, none has fully escaped the need to cloak authority in religious legitimacy.
Afghanistan represents an even starker case. With the return of the Taliban to power, religion became the explicit foundation of the state. The Taliban’s claim to legitimacy rests almost entirely on their interpretation of Islam, with little reference to electoral consent or pluralism. Governance is justified not through popular sovereignty but through divine mandate. This model, while extreme, resonates across borders by reinforcing the idea that political authority can be grounded in religious authenticity rather than institutional accountability.
Iran, though not South Asian in the narrow geographic sense, exerts profound influence on the region and illustrates a similar pattern. Its clerical state demonstrates how religion, once fused with power, reshapes foreign policy, internal governance, and regional alignments. For South Asia, Iran serves both as inspiration and cautionary tale—proof that religious authority can sustain a state, but also that it can harden politics into rigid ideological conflict.
Bangladesh’s trajectory adds another layer to this regional picture. Born out of a secular nationalist struggle in 1971, the country initially rejected religion-based politics. Yet over time, political competition, military rule, and global Islamist currents reopened the space for religious mobilisation. In recent years, Islamist parties have re-emerged as significant players, benefiting from public disillusionment with traditional elites and widespread demands for moral governance. Here, religion is less about theological rule and more about presenting an alternative to corruption and authoritarianism.
Several common forces explain why religion has become so politically potent across South Asia. One is the failure of post-independence states to deliver inclusive economic growth. Persistent inequality, unemployment, and corruption have eroded trust in secular political institutions. Religion offers moral clarity in a landscape of broken promises. Another factor is identity anxiety in a globalised world. As economic and cultural change accelerates, religious identity provides a sense of stability and belonging that politics alone often fails to supply.
Electoral democracy itself has also played a paradoxical role. Far from marginalising religion, competitive politics has encouraged parties to mobilise religious sentiment as a reliable voting bloc. In societies where religious identity is deeply rooted, appealing to faith can be more effective than offering complex policy programmes. Once religion proves electorally successful, it becomes self-reinforcing: rivals either imitate the strategy or risk irrelevance.
The consequences of this transformation are profound. Religion-driven politics tends to narrow the definition of citizenship, making minorities vulnerable and dissent suspect. It blurs the line between belief and loyalty, where questioning the state can be framed as questioning faith itself. At the same time, it reshapes regional relations. India’s ties with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even Afghanistan are increasingly filtered through religious perceptions, complicating diplomacy and heightening mistrust.
Yet religion’s political rise does not mean South Asia is destined for theocracy or permanent conflict. Across the region, large segments of society remain politically pragmatic. Voters may respond to religious rhetoric, but they also care deeply about governance, stability, and economic opportunity. The struggle unfolding today is not simply between religion and secularism, but over how religion is used: as a moral compass compatible with pluralism, or as a weapon of exclusion.
Religion has become the most crucial political element of South Asia because it speaks to identity, grievance, hope, and power all at once. It fills gaps left by failing institutions and unsettled histories. Whether it ultimately deepens democracy or undermines it will depend not on faith itself, but on the political choices made in its name.
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